This Note examines the conflicting provisions of the Liability Convention in the context of the Cosmos 954 incident to determine whether the damages that Canada claimed would be recoverable under the Convention. The analysis will illustrate the need for change in the Liability Convention's definition of the measure of damages. Finally, this Note presents a proposal that would render the provisions more consistent with the spirit and the purpose of the Liability Convention.
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations General Assembly endorsed the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects' (Liability Convention or Convention), on November 29, 1971.2 The Liability Convention was the result often years work 3 by the Legal Sub-Committee of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 4 (COPUOS). One of the goals of the Convention is to provide a measure of damages for cases involving injury or damage caused by space objects. 5 The final draft, however, included two conflicting definitions for this measure. 6 As a result, it is unclear what damages would be recoverable under the Convention. 7 The Liability Convention has been invoked only once; in the Cosmos 954 incident. 8 In 1978, a Soviet satellite crashed in the Canadian Northwest. Later that same year, the Canadian Government presented a claim for damages based in part on the Liability Convention, to the Government of the Soviet Union. The incident was resolved through diplomatic channels, and the majority of the provisions of the Liability Convention were left untested.
This Note examines the conflicting provisions of the Liability Convention in the context of the Cosmos 954 incident to determine whether the damages that Canada claimed would be recoverable under the Convention. 9 The analysis will illustrate the need for change in the Liability Convention's definition of the meaure of damages.' 0 Finally, this Note presents a proposal that would render the provisions more consistent with the spirit and the purpose of the Liability Convention."
I. PURPOSE OF THE LIABILITY CONVENTION

Reentry
12 of space object fragments into the earth's atmosphere has been rare, relative to the number of space obsary for it to achieve at least one orbit." Id. at 109; see also Cheng, supra note 3, at 116-17 (discussing the definition of "space object").
6. See infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text. 7. See Foster, supra note 2, at 157. " [N] o indication is given as to whether claims will lie for both direct and indirect damage." Id.; see G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, supra note 2, at 102; Haanappel, Some Observations on the Crash of Cosmos 954, 6J. SPACE L. 147, 148 (1978) .
8. See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text. There have been other incidents where alarm was raised by the reentry of space objects into the earth's atmosphere. Most notable among these are the Skylab incident in which a United States space lab landed in the Australian desert and sea after a fall that carried it over several continents, Lyons, Skylab Debris Hits Australian Desert; No Harm Reported, N.Y. Times, July 12, 1979 , at Al, col. 5, and the Cosmos 1402 incident, where another Soviet satellite in the Cosmos line fell from orbit and crashed harmlessly into the Indian Ocean. Wilford, Russian Satellite Falls Harmlessly Over Indian Ocean, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1983 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LIABILITY CONVENTION
On December 13, 1958, COPUOS was created to establish legal principles and guidelines governing the use of outer space. 2 " The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space 2 soon followed, establishing the application of international law and the Charter of the United Nations to outer space. 2 The subject of liability for damages from space vehicle accidents was first addressed by COPUOS in 195923 and was immediately given priority status. 4 92, 92 (1972) .
Herbert Reis, United States Delegate to the Legal Sub-Committee, remarked that the fundamental American goal of the Convention was to assure the payment of prompt and fair compensation to citizens who might be injured as a result of the reentry of fragments of a foreign manmade space object. Reis, Some Reflections on the Liability Convention for Outer Space, 6 J. SPACE L. 125, 126 (1978) . The Convention itself sets forth its purpose as follows:
Recognizing the need to elaborate effective international rules and procedures concerning liability for damage caused by space objects and to ensure, in particular, the prompt payment under the terms of this Convention of a full and equitable measure of compensation to victims of such damage Liability Convention, supra note 1, preamble. 20. See generally C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 12-20 (discussing the birth of COPUOS L. 1, 5 (1979) .
22. Declaration of Principles, supra note 21, at 15. "The activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space shall be carried on in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding." Id.; see Dembling, supra note 21, at 5. 23. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 60; Foster, supra note 2, at 138. On July 14, 1959, the Committee reported that "the issue of 'liability for injury or damage caused by space vehicles' would arise in the exploration, use, and exploitation of the space environment." C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 60; see Foster, supra note 2, at 138. 24. C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 60; Cheng, supra note 3, at 83. 25. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/L.4, supra note 3.
ginning a ten year process of negotiation, both formal and informal, 26 that ended in the endorsement of the Liability Convention in 1971. 27 During that ten year period, the drafting of two other treaties had an impact on the development, and delayed the drafting of the Liability Convention. 28 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 29 (Principles Treaty) , was drafted primarily during the Legal Sub-Committee's Fifth Session, held in 1966. 30 It was intended to establish basic principles upon which international space law, in the form of agreements and conventions, could be built.
26. Cheng, supra note 3, at 89. As a result, it is impossible to tell how and when agreement was reached on some of the most crucial liability issues. Id.
27. G.A. Res. 2777, supra note 2, at 25. The Delegations of Canada, Iran, Japan, and Sweden were unable to support the Convention "because they believed it would have been preferable to have had incorporated in the text provisions on measures of compensation and especially on the settlement of claims more in accordance with those that they had earlier proposed in the Legal Sub-Committee." UNCOPUOS Report, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carred out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present Treaty. The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty. When activities are carried on in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization. Principles Treaty, supra note 3, art. VI. Article VII provides as follows:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an Negotiation on the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched Into Outer Space" (Return Agreement) lasted almost as long as negotiation on the Liability Convention, 34 primarily due to a general lack of interest on the part of the delegates from nations other than those from the Soviet Union and the United States.
3 5 Article 5 of the Return Agreement refers to the obligations of the launching state to bear the expenses of cleanup and recovery when a satellite lands in the territory of a signatory state. 3 6 The article has been read to relieve the launching state of responsibility for such costs where the launching state does not request the return of its space object. 3 7 As long as that state declines to request the return of its space object, the Return Agreement does not apply. The victim state must rely on the Liability Convention for any relief in object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the Earth, in air spaqe. or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. L. 53, 53 (1979) .
35. Lee, supra note 34, at 53. The subject of the Return Agreement was not of primary interest to anyone but the space powers who had space objects and astronauts to be concerned about. Id. There was some basic disagreement on legal issues and approaches to the issues between the two space powers. Id.
36. Return Agreement, supra note 33, art. 5(5). Article 5(5) provides that "[e]xpenses incurred in fulfilling obligations to recover and return a space object or its component parts under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall be borne by the launching authority." Id. In essence, the provision "provides for payment by the launching authority of expenses incurred by a Contracting Party in recovering and returning a space object or component part, if requested by the launching party." Dembling, Cosmos 954 and the Space Treaties, 6J. SPACE L. 129, 132 (1978) .
37. Dembling, supra note 36, at 132. The treaty provides that recovery and return expenses "shall be borne" by the launching authority. Return Agreement, supra note 33, art. 5(5). "Since the expenses incurred by the Contracting Party must be borne by the launching state, a launching authority's request for such recovery and return is a condition of this obligation." Dembling, supra note 36, at 132; see Lee, supra note 34, at 72; Address by L.H. Legault & A. Farand, Canada's Claim for Damage Caused by the Soviet Cosmos 954 Satellite, at 16, American Bar Ass'n Forum Committee on Air and Space Law, First Annual Forum (Feb. 23-25, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Legault & Farand]. paying for the removal of the space object. 3 The ten year delay in finalizing the Liability Convention was caused by the lack of consensus° among the Legal SubCommittee members on such issues as the law applicable to the measurement of damages, the status of international organizations with respect to the Convention, dispute resolution procedures, limitation of liability, and nuclear damage. 40 The major factor in the delay, frequently complained of by the United Nations General Assembly, 4 t was the plurality of views among the members of the Legal Sub-Committee. 4 2 The unwillingness of certain members of the Legal Sub-Committee to participate in its proceedings was blamed for some delay. 4 We at first found it difficult to engage the serious attention of the Soviet Union, which, indeed, preferred throughout the following eight years of negotiation not to put forward proposals under its own name but instead to rely upon Hungary.
Even today there might have been no liability convention but for the efforts of the Government of India which took the initiative of trying to overcome a completed before a detailed liability agreement could be reached."4
III. CONFLICT IN THE PROVISIONS OF THE LIABILITY CONVENTION
Articles I, II, and XII of the Liability Convention outline the process of defining and determining damages in space object accidents. 4 5 However, these articles suffer from inconsistencies that make that process confusing. 46 oss of or damage to property" has been described as "an interference with the property resulting in the destruction or damage of the property or in its being in any way . . . rendered unfit for the use for which it was intended." Foster, supra note 2, at 156-57.
48. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. I. The limitation of the term to these concepts "reflects the idea of sharing the burden of damage caused in operating sources of special danger between the operator of the technology and the parties that tion for "damage," presumably as defined in article J.
4 9 Under article XII, compensaton for damage is to be "determined in accordance with international law and the principles of justice and equity," so that the claimant will be restored to the condition that would have existed had no damage occurred. 50 Articles XIV through XX establish and set out the guidelines for a Claims Commission, which handles disputes between nations unable to resolve such disputes through diplomatic procedures." The restoration proposed by article XII is beyond the scope of the limited definition of "damage" in article I. For sustained the damage." G. ZHUKOV 53, 53 (1982) . The deadlock was caused by disagreement on two issues: the settlement of claims and the question of applicable law. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 184; see infra note 57.
The final text of article XII, adopted pursuant to a compromise between factions of the Legal Sub-Committee, was designed primarily to provide full compensation to victims and restore them to the status quo ante. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text. See generally P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 185-92 (discussing the presentation and debate on the language which ultimately became article XII).
51. Liability Convention, supra note 1, arts. XIV-XX; see C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 82-83; Foster, supra note 2, at 173-77. If diplomatic negotiations are unsuccessful after one year following submission of a claim, a Claims Commission can be called by either party. See Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. XIV. The Commission has three members. One member is to be nominated by the claimants, one member will be nominated by the respondents, and one member will be nominated by the parties jointly. Id. art. XV. The purpose of the Claims Commission is to provide a forum for the settlement of disputes where the parties cannot agree through diplomacy. See id. art. XIV.
Decisions of the Commission are not binding but are subject to immediate publication. Id. art. XIX. This is an odd result which created much debate in the Legal Sub-Committee. Foster, supra note 2, at 175. example, the drafters were aware, as article XXI attests, 52 that the reentry of a space vehicle might present large-scale danger to human life and might seriously threaten vital population centers. 53 Article XII, with its reference to international law and the principles ofjustice and equity, 5 4 seems to compensate for damages incurred by a state in taking reasonable meaures to prevent the threatened danger. 55 Nevertheless, article I precludes such recovery by limiting damage to the items listed. 5 6 52. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. XXI. Article XXI provides as follows:
If the damage caused by a space object presents a large-scale danger to human life or seriously interferes with the living conditions of the population or the functioning of vital centers, the States Parties, and in particular the launching State, shall examine the possibility of rendering appropriate and rapid assistance to the State which has suffered the damage, when it so requests. However, nothing in this article shall affect the rights or obligations of the States Parties under this Convention.
Id.
53. Article XXI recognizes the danger but does very little about it. It imposes on the launching state the obligation, in the event of such danger, to "examine the possibility" of giving some sort of help and then only if the damaged state requests it. Id. It does not affect the rights and obligations of the parties in the other articles of the Convention. Rajski, supra note 17, at 256; see also STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 38 ("Use of the word 'examine' appears to indicate that a state is not obligated under the Convention to actually render such assistance."). See generally Cheng, supra note 3, at 132-33 (discussing article XXI of the Liability Convention).
54. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. XII. 55. "National courts generally take these factors [preventive measures] into account when granting compensation, considering that the victim should take steps to mitigate damage and that costs incurred in doing so should be recoverable." Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 13. This is especially true if the term "equity" in article XII is used in its popular sense to signify moral justice and not in the Anglo-Ameri- L. 151, 153 (1978) . "Pursuant to such a formulation, it would be possible to avoid the rigors of strictly legal approaches to the measurement of damages and adapt relief to the circumstances of any given case." Christol, supra note 13, at 358. If the measure of compensation is to be determined by international law and the principles ofjustice and equity, and if the tribunal has "the power to meet the moral standards of justice in a particular case . . . so as to adapt the relief to the circumstances of the particular case," H.L. Mc-CLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EQurTV 1 (1948), it is inconsistent to argue that article XII does not require the launching state to compensate the victim state for preventive measure damages when the victim state was in no way responsible for the landing of the space object.
56. G. ZHUKOV & Y. KoLosov, supra note 2, at 105; see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
IV. LEGAL SUB-COMMITTEE'S DEBATE ON COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE
The Legal Sub-Committee's treatment of the measures of compensation in article XII consisted largely of a debate over whether the measure should be determined by reference to general international law or to the law of a particular state. The debate over applicable law shaped up between those nations who thought that the law of the launching state should govern and those who thought that the law of the state of the injured party or of the state of the occurrence of the harm was the appropriate choice. See P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 179; infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text. See generally Cheng, supra note 3, at 122-31 (discussing the Legal The Soviet bloc nations 5 8 backed a proposal calling for application of the law of the launching state. 59 These nations Sub-Committee's treatment of applicable law); Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at 366-68 (report on the debate on applicable law).
The scope of this debate, as perceived by the United States delegate to the Legal Sub-Committee, was as follows: "As we understand it, applicable law involves the legal context which the liability convention will provide to serve as a guide in determining what elements of that particular claim are to be treated as compensable under the treaty regime." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.73, at 63 (1969) (statement of the United States).
This statement embodies the Legal Sub-Committee's approach to the definition of compensable harms. The Sub-Committee, unable to agree upon the inclusion of the term "indirect damage" or any similar term in the article I definition of damage, abandoned its discussion of the definition without ever reaching an agreement on whether any damage other than the items listed in article I would be compensable. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 33. It later addressed the issue of indirect damage in the context of applicable law. Id. It finally resolved that the question of indirect damages would be left. to be "fought out, in each separate case, by the parties involved according to international law, and the principles of justice and equity, with the purpose of restoring the victim to the condition which would have existed if the damages had not occurred." Id.
This development essentially deferred the whole question of the compensability of damages to the parties to resolve in whatever manner they may choose. Cf. Summary Record of the Fifty-Fourth Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.54, at 11 (1966) (statement of Romania) ("[t]hus, to invoke international law was simply to defer the whole question."); Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at 367 (discussing statement of Romanian delegate); see also N. MATrE, supra note 19, at 157 ("in each case, this question will have to be decided upon the basis of international law and the principles ofjustice and equity..."). As a result, the limited definition of damage in article I precludes the application of international law to the issue of which damages are compensable. See Gorove, Cosmos 954: Issues of Law and Policy, 6J. SPACE L. 136, 142 (1978) .
58. The Soviet bloc nations included the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and Hungary. See Cheng, supra note 3, at 123 n.246. " [T] he other members of the Legal Sub-Committee, including Romania" were opposed to the "Soviet Block" view on applicable law. Id. at 123. There seems to be no simple way to discern which states joined which bloc, Soviet or non-Soviet, in the debate on applicable law. The ambiguous nature of these labels in the first place increases the difficulty of determining which nations joined which in the Legal Sub-Committee. It is certain, however, that Hungary and Bulgaria joined the Soviet Union in the debate, while the non-Soviet bloc included at least the United Kingdom, Austria, Canada, Sweden, and Italy. Id.; see also II MANUAL ON SPACE L. 461 (list of United Nations Documents emanating from COPUOS and its Legal Sub-Committee between July 14, 1959 and November 29, 1971 , when G.A. Res. 2777, supra note 2, the Resolution accepting the Liability Convention, was adopted, all dealing with the question of liability).
59. Cheng, supra note 3, at 123-24; Deleau, supra note 42, at 882; Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at 367. It was the Hungarian Proposal, supra note 57, which first presented the idea of applying the law of the launching state to the determination of compensation for the purposes of the Convention. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.10/Rev.I, at 2-3. The Hungarian Proposal provided that states which did not recognize immaterial damage would not have to pay for such damage.
wished to spread the "burden of damage ' 60 that resulted from the advancement of space technology and use, and to retain some degree of control over those damages for which they might become liable. 6 '
The non-Soviet bloc nations 6 2 countered that such a provision would make it too easy for launching states to fashion special statutes limiting their own responsibility. 63 PV.73, at 66 (1969) . The law of the launching state was therefore unacceptable to all of the non-Soviet bloc states and Romania. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 177.
64. Belgian Proposal, supra note 57, at 1; see Cheng, supra note 3, at 122-24 (discussing the non-Soviet bloc proposals); Nanda, Liability for Space Activities, 41 U. COLO. L. REV. 509, 519-21 (1969) . The application of the national law of the person injured was objected to because of the possibility that, in case the damage involved victims of many different nationalities, a veritable plethora of domestic laws would apply in respect of the same incident, thus complicating the procedures. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 178; see Deleau, supra note 42, at 882. Furthermore, the application of so many different laws is likely to produce inconsistent adjudications of the same case. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 178.
65. The law of the place where the damage occurred, or lex loci delicti commissi, from most of the non-Soviet bloc states.
66
The Soviet bloc nations opposed this proposal because they were afraid that nonspace powers would fashion extremely self-serving laws, and that launching states might thereby be held internationally responsible for damages they would not be liable for under their own laws. 66. See supra note 58. The United States Proposal, supra note 57, called for the application of international law and the principles ofjustice and equity to the determination of compensation for damages. Id. While the United States temporarily gave support to the concept of lex loci delicti commissi in this context, it eventually returned to its original proposal. See Cheng, supra note 3, at 127.
67. Cheng, supra note 3, at 124-25. The worst Soviet fear seemed to be that they would be forced to pay exorbitant compensation for "moral and immaterial" damage. Id. The Soviet Delegate said that "in his delegation's view the draft agreement should not apply to compensation for moral damage or, in other words, pain and suffering." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.100, at 137 (1968) (statement of the U.S.S.R). This view was based on the difference between Soviet law, which does not allow awards of punitive damages, and the civil law of countries which do allow punitive damage awards. Id. at 137-38.
That Soviet fear was probably well-founded. In the words of the Italian Delegate, the advantage of allowing for application of the law of the place of the accident was that it "would provide more effective protection for the victim, since the State concerned might well pass a special law in favour of its own nationals." Id. at 137 (statement of Italy). This concept was also expressed by reference to "full compensation" made by many of the delegates. See, e.g., Cocca, supra note 19, at 92. This was a central theme of the debate on applicable law. See Cheng, supra note 3, at 125; see also Rajski, supra note 17, at 253 (discussing "full compensation").
The views of many of the delegates were summed up by the delegate from Lebanon, who stated that "[w]hat he wanted was simply the law that was most favourable to the victim state. said that a number of speakers had stressed that the proposed convention should be as simple as possible, should be designed to protect the interests of the victim and that its provisions should be specific." Id. at 134; U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C.2/SR.99, at 131 (1968) (statement of France). "The main concern of his country was for the victim, who should be ensured the same treatment whatever the circumstances. It was essential that regulations concerning the victim should be uniform and should not differ according to the type of accident." Id.; Cheng, supra note 3, at 129.
68. Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at 367-68; see also Cheng, supra note 3, at
The Legal Sub-Committee finally adopted a compromise proposal that compensation should be determined in accordance with international law and the principles of justice and equity. 69 Although the proposal was not greeted with enthusiasm," it eventually won the grudging support of the Legal Sub-Committee. 7 ' 122-31 (discussing proposals and counter-proposals on applicable law). See generally P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 179-85 (discussing the complete "deadlock" between opposing members of the Legal Sub-Committee).
69. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. XII; see United States Proposal, supra note 57, art. 11(4). The debate on applicable law and the settlement of disputes dragged on through the ninth session in 1970. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 181. In that session, Italy made reference to the United States Proposal, supra note 57, of using international law without any reference to national law in the determination of compensation. During the ninth session, debate was mostly informal, but when the plenary meetings began again, it was clear that no agreement had been reached on these two issues. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 181. It was during this session as well that the concept of restoration "in full to the condition equivalent to that which would have existed if the damage had not occurred" was introduced. Id. at 182.
Just when "deadlock was complete," a more favorable political climate prevailed and in 1971 the two major space powers were finally induced to agree on a compromise proposal submitted by Belgium, Hungary and Brazil. P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 184. This compromise proposal marked a return to the approach of the United States Proposal, supra note 57, and was eventually, "with some ... stylistic changes 70. Criticism of the proposal was based on the view that international law was too vague to provide sufficient guidelines for the determination of compensation. Rajski, supra note 17, at 252; P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 185-86; see also Deleau, supra note 42, at 886 (acceptance of the compromise language was arrived at "sans enthousiasme"). The Romanian Delegate to the Legal Sub-Committee, in particular, criticized the compromise language of the compensation provision because he said that there is "no established international law in the field under consideration . ... There were no generally recognized rules of law that were applicable .... When the reference to the principles ofjustice and equity is seen as a reference
The result is that because of inconsistencies in the definition and determination of damages, the Liability Convention is incapable of providing prompt compensation to a victim that suffers anything other than physical, psychological, or property damage or loss of life. 7 2 The Cosmos 954 incident provided the first case where a claim was made by one sovereign state against another based on the Liability Convention. 7 3 Since the resolution of the Cosmos 954 incident, speculation on the recoverability of damages under the Convention has grown. 7 4
V. THE COSMOS 954 INCIDENT
A. Background
Cosmos 954 was an ocean surveillance satellite 75 that had to "recognized standards and not to that of particular society," the argument that international law is too vague loses much of its validity. Rajski, supra note 17, at 252. As one commentator has observed, many. . . states. . . held the erroneous idea that the matter had little to do with public international law and that, in order to achieve their objective, private international law dictated the choice of the lex loci delicti commissi. A number of them committed the further mistake of either believing that public international law was, in this regard, vague and deficient, or thinking that the fact space law was still "embryonic" had anything to do with the matter, as if the problem was specific to space law. Cheng, supra note 3, at 125-26. See generally Dembling & Arons, supra note 39, at 367 (report on the progress of the Legal Sub-Committee on the issue of applicable law). This point takes on added emphasis if the term equity is used in its popular sense to signify moral justice and not in its Anglo-American legal sense. See supra note 55.
72 The United States Air Force North American Air Defense Command (NORAD), conducts operations, using radars, cameras, and radio equipment situated throughout the world, to observe and track all objects launched into space. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 5; Doyle, supra note 12, at 107. "Among other functions, the NORAD Space Defense Center also compiles predictions for satellites, rockets and other pieces of debris that are likely to survive burnup in the friction of atmospheric reentry." Id.
79. See Dembling, supra note 36, at 130. 80. The satellite, upon reentry, "had . . .broken up and spread across hundreds of kilometres of almost totally uninhabited snow-covered land." Aikman, supra note 78, at 8.
81. "The satellite reentered the earth's atmosphere at 6:53 a.m. EST January 24th over the Great Slave Lake in the Mackenzie District of Canada's Northwest Territories and disintegrated from atmospheric friction 96 kilometers (60 miles) from Yellowknife, the territorial capital." Facts on File, Feb. 4, 1978, at 57. 82. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 2, at 902. According to Soviet correspondence with Canada following the fall, the satellite carried on board a nuclear reactor powered by uranium enriched with isotope of uranium-235. Id.
83. See Aikman, supra note 78, at 5; Galloway, supra note 78, at 401. The concern was verbalized this way by Major Aikman: "Had the intensely radioactive core disintegrated while re-entering the earth's atmosphere? Or had it crashed, with its potentially lethal fragments radiating from the depths of an all-encompassing snow? Or This concern led to a major search and recovery operation by the Canadian Armed Forces and the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada, called Operation Morning Light. 8 4 It was an airborne and ground operation designed to locate and recover or remove parts of the Soviet satellite and any nuclear debris. 85 Specifically, the Canadians' purpose was to identify the nature and extent of the damage caused by the debris, to limit the existing damage and to minimize the risk of future damage and to restore to the extent possible the affected areas to the condition that would have existed if the intrusion of the satellite and the deposit of the debris had both occurred?" Aikman, supra note 78, at 5; see also Dembling, supra note 36, at 130 ("the satellite's reactor [clould have produced about 100,000 curies of fission products like strontium-90 and cesium-137. These are poisonous wastes of nuclear power."); Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 677 (concern about the reactor led to a large-scale airborne and ground recovery operation 909, 910 (1979) . The total costs incurred by Canada in Operation Morning Light were Can.$12,048,239.11. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 8, at 904.
Canada claimed as compensation only the costs incurred "in order to restore Canada to the condition which would have existed if the damage inflicted by the Cosmos 954 satellite had not occurred," consistent with its claim for an article XII measure of compensation. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 19, at 906. The language of paragraph 19 is drawn from article XII. Id. The amount claimed, Can.$6,041,174.70, included only "incremental costs" that would not have been incurred if the incident had not taken place. Thus the salaries of military and public servants involved in Operation Morning Light were not included, although overtime, transport, and maintenance costs incurred by them as a direct result of the operation were included. Thus, even though Canada spent approximately Can.$13 million on the operation, only six million dollars were included in the claim. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 24, at 908.
85. Aikman, supra note 78, at 5. The Department of National Defense of Canada led the search for nuclear debris, while the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada (AECB) was assigned general debris recovery duties. Id. see Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 4; Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 677.
had not occurred. 8 6 The total costs incurred by Canada in Operation Morning Light were close to Can.$14 million.
Approximately one year after the incident, Canada presented a claim against the Soviet Union 88 for just over Can. $6 million as compensation for damage allegedly caused by the 86. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 8, at 904. 87. Id. 88. The Soviet Union's delayed response to the questions of the Canadian Government regarding the satellite reentry was one reason for the year's lapse between the incident and the claim. See id. paras. 4, 7, at 902-03. On the day the satellite entered Canadian airspace, January 24, 1978, the Canadian Government had expressed to the Soviet Ambassador its surprise at not having been warned of the satellite's possible reentry. Id. Later the same day, Soviet authorities offered to send a "group of specialists to ameliorate the possible consequences and evacuate remnants of the satellite." Id. para. 5, at 903. The Canadian response was that their "urgent need was for immediate and complete answers to the questions posed earlier on January 24, 1978." Id. The Soviet aid, offered January 24, was declined because the search and recovery operations had already begun. See Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 5. According to certain authors, " [t] he Soviet Union may have been concerned that the search and recovery programme was partly motivated by the desire to gather intelligence about the construction of the Cosmos satellite and not for safety rea- While the Soviet Union eventually recognized that debris from Cosmos 954 did indeed land in Canadian territory, it "practically excluded" the possibility of nuclear contamination. Id. annex B, at 928 (note of May 31, 1978 from the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. at Ottawa to the Department of External Affairs of Canada). The Soviet Union did not request the return of the recovered parts of the satellite. Id. annex B, at 916 (note of Feb. 20, 1978 from the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. at Ottawa). The Soviets stated that " [t] he Embassy is authorized to state that the objects mentioned in the Department's note of February 8, 1978 do not present interest to the Soviet side as such and, consequently, the Canadian side can continue to dispose with them at its own discretion." Id. The Soviet Note of March 21, 1978 , from the Embassy of the U.S.S.R. reiterated that: "The Embassy is authorized to state once again that those objects as such do not present interest to the Soviet side and accordingly the Canadian side can deal with them at its own discretion." Id. annex B, at 922.
The Soviet disclaimers may have been an attempt to avoid paying any compensation, under article 5 of the Return Agreement, for the search and recovery operations. Article 5 of the Return Agreement provides that: "Expenses incurred in fulfilling obligations to recover and return a space object or its component parts under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article shall be borne by the launching authority." Return Agreement, supra note 33, art. 5(5). Taken by itself, article 5 of the Return Agreement appears to relieve the launching state of the duty to pay the costs of the search and recovery operation so long as it does not ask for the return of the space object or fall of the Soviet satellite, Cosmos 954.89 The Canadians did not rely exclusively on the Liability Convention in making this claim. Instead, they based it primarily on the Liability Convention, and, secondarily, on general principles of international law. 90 its component parts. Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 16; see supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
89. Canadian Claim, supra note 75; see Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 14. Canada decided to depart from normal diplomatic procedure and publish the claim and the accompanying documents and diplomatic exchanges between itself and the Soviet Union. The Canadians felt that public knowledge of the claim would foster a better understanding of the principles and rules of international law which were involved. Id. at 14-15. The claim was drafted by an interdepartmental committee of the Departments ofJustice and External Affairs of the Canadian Government. Id. at 6. The claim may be summarized as follows:
The main element of the claim, at least from a jurist's point of view, is the "statement of claim". This document, in a first section titled "the facts", recalls the events on a chronological basis. Mention is made of the launching of the satellite and the related notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations, the entry of the satellite into earth's atmosphere, and the scattering of debris over a wide area of Canadian territory. It analyses the communications established between Canadian and Soviet authorities in Ottawa. It explains the reasons that prompted the undertaking of search and recovery operations. The objectives and costs of these operations are fully described. A link is clearly established between the debris recovered and the launching State, the USSR. In a second section entitled "the law", the Canadian Government held the USSR responsible for the damage suffered by Canada following the fall of Cosmos 954. Other documents were included in the claim: annexes B, C, D and E contained technical data supporting the allegations made by the Government of Canada in its statement of claim. Id. at 7-8.
90. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 17, at 905; see Galloway, supra note 78, at 413; Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 9.
Canada's claim is based jointly and separately on (a) the relevant international agreements and in particular the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects, to which both Canada and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are parties, and (b) general principles of international law. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 14, at 905. The claim itself indicated it was based jointly and severally on applicable conventions and general principles of international law, but it relied heavily on the Liability Convention as the legal basis for the claim. "In other words, the Canadian government chose to focus on the remedies available under the convention rather than on other legal grounds." Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 9.
This focus is evident from paragraphs 15 through 19 of the claim. Paragraph 19 in particular addresses the measure of compensation under article XII of the Liability Convention. Paragraph 19 reads as follows:
In respect of compensation for damage caused by space objects, the Convention provides for " . . . such reparation in respect of damage as will re-
B. Analysis of the Claim
Canada's use of a secondary claim based on general principles of international law is illustrative of the problems a state faces in attempting to frame a claim for damages under the Liability Convention. Used as the basis of a claim for damages, this secondary claim is superfluous and undercuts the validity of the Convention by intimating its lack of force. 91 The purposes of the Convention in establishing certain procedures would be thwarted if other channels could be used to present a claim. 92 The elements of the Canadian Claim included damage to store . . . [the claimant] to the condition which would have existed if the damage had not occurred" (Article XII). In accordance with its Preamble, the Convention seeks to ensure ". . . the prompt payment ... [under its terms] of a full and equitable measure of compensation to victims of such damage" (Fourth preambular paragraph). Canada's claim includes only those costs which were incurred in order to restore Canada to the condition which would have existed if the damage inflicted by the Cosmos 954 satellite had not occurred. The Convention also provides that "[t]he compensation which the launching State shall be liable to pay for damage under this Convention shall be determined in accordance with international law and the principles ofjustice and equity .. " (Article XII). In calculating the compensation claimed, Canada has applied the relevant criteria established by general principles of international law and has limited the costs included in its claim to those costs that are reasonable, proximately caused by the intrusion of the satellite and deposit of debris and capable of being calculated with a reasonable degree of certainty. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 19, at 906.
91. Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 707. " [T] he history of its development and its text support the contention that the Liability Convention is intended to be exhaustive . . . . The international law of state responsibility for unintentional intrusions was uncertain to begin with, and its application to space objects even more contentious." Id. The Principles Treaty was too broad to provide adequate clarity in international law on this issue, and it was for this reason that the Liability Convention was needed in the first place. See id. at 707-10. The history of the drafting of the Liability Convention indicates that il was intended to be exhaustive of the claimant's rights in space accident cases. That intent would be undermined if states could resort to more ambiguous sources of international law to make further claims. Id. at 708-09.
92. Id. at 708-09. Article XI(2) of the Liability Convention, supra note 1, is consistent with this notion in that it allows no claims outside the Convention for the same damages as those claimed under the Convention. Article XI(2) provides as follows:
A State shall not, however, be entitled to present a claim under this Convention in respect of the same damage for which a claim is being pursued in the courts or administrative tribunals or agencies of a launching State or under another international agreement which is binding on the States concerned. Id. art. XI(2). See generally Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 711 (the general policy property, 9 3 mitigation of or prevention of damage 9 4 and violation of sovereignty. 95 Of these, the primary claims were those of damage to property and mitigation of damages. 9 6 1. Damage to Property
The Canadian claim described as damage to property the "deposit of hazardous radioactive debris from the satellite throughout a large area of Canadian territory, and the presence of that debris in the environment rendering part of Canada's territory unfit for use." 9 7 It is not certain, however, that damage as contemplated in article I of the Convention did in fact occur, 9 8 because the Cosmos 954 satellite landed in uninhabited territory. 9 9 This landing resulted in alteration of the of article XI being that claimants under the Liability Convention should not be able to resort to other channels).
93 98. See Dembling, supra note 36, at 133 ("an argument may be made out that there was no such damage since there was no loss of life, no personal injuries involved, or other impairment of health"); Gorove, supra note 57, at 138, 140-42 (discussing the "intricate" process of assessing liability and the extent of the damage); Haanappel, supra note 7, at 147-48 (the Liability Convention's definition of damage "can by no stretch of the imagination" cover Canada's costs "in preventing potential damage where actual damage never occurred or remains unmeasurable"). But see Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 714-16 (discussing damage to persons and property and mitigation); Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 9-10 (discussing the Canadian claim for damages).
99. Aikman, supra note 78, at 5, 8. Doubt about the existence of actual damage was caused by the fact that the satellite landed in almost totally uninhabited territory. Id. "This was in a sense fortunate, for the land between the two points consists of the Barrenlands; for the most part a treeless, uninhabited area." Id. at 5. In fact, one of the major discoveries of radiation, at the Thelon River site, was made accidentally by two campers who had "left the campsite on January 25 to travel by dogsled north along the Thelon River to learn more about the barrenlands." Id. at 8.
The unknown quality of the danger to human life was what necessitated the cleanup operation and thus the great expense to which Canada went. Schwartz & Berlin, supra note 73, at 716. The impossibility of making safe use of the land was called "damage to property." Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 9-10; cf. Foster, supra note 2, at 156-57. Damage to property has been characterized as interference conditions on the land which, while making the territory unsafe, made it unsafe to an unknown degree.' 0 0 Unless there was damage within the article I meaning of the word, article XII was powerless to supply the compensation Canada sought in its claim despite its reference to international law and the principles of justice and equity.' 0 " If the property damage issue had come before a Claims Commission pursuant to articles XIV through XX of the Liability Convention, it is conceivable that Canada could have been denied recovery on this basis.1 0 2
Preventive Measures
Compensation was also sought by the Canadians pursuant to a perceived "duty to take the necessary measures to prevent and reduce the harmful consequences of the damage and thereby to mitigate damages."' 0 3 Canada's mitigation claim consisted of search, recovery, removal, testing, and cleanup therewith resulting in the property being rendered unfit for the use for which it was intended. Id.
The Liability Convention makes no direct mention of nuclear damage. See G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, supra note 2, at 102; Deleau, supra note 42, at 878. "In fact, the view has been expressed that the convention covers every kind of damage, including nuclear damage, but this does not follow from its text." G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, supra note 2, at 102. The majority view seems to be that nuclear damages are incorporated in the article I reference to "damage to property." See, e.g., C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 94; S. GOROVE, STUDIES IN SPACE LAW: ITS CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 128 (1977); Cheng, supra note 3, at 115; Foster, supra note 2, at 155-57.
100. See Aikman, supra note 78, at 5. 101. See Gorove, supra note 57, at 142; supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. "[Tihe occurrence of actual damage is the precondition of the invocation of the principles ofjustice and equity as well as of the eventual restitution." Gorove, supra note 57, at 142. The argument has been made, based on the concept of a "precondition of damage," that the article I definition "can by no stretch of the imagination cover the costs incurred by Canada in preventing potential damage, where actual damage never occurred or remains unmeasurable (such as general damage to the environment)." Haanappel, supra note 7, at 148-49 (footnote omitted).
102. Haanappel, supra note 7, at 149. This is especially true given that the reference to "justice and equity" introduces an arbitrary element, i.e., the views of the claims judges, into the Convention's dispute resolution procedure. Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 13.
103. Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 17, at 905-06. This reveals some ambiguity in the Canadian Claim. Paragraph 17 was printed in the section of the claim entitled "International Agreements" under subheading "(a)." Subheading "(b)" was reserved for "General Principles of International Law." Still, the mitigation claim in paragraph 17 was based on general principles of international law, with no reference at all to the Liability Convention. Most conspicuous by its absence from this paragraph is any reference to article XII, the only article of the Liability Convention operations. 107. This is because of the inconsistencies pointed out earlier between articles I and XII of the Liability Convention. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
It has been hypothesized that a space object might reenter the earth's atmosphere in such a manner as to cause "massive hysteria" in a densely populated city, "requiring hospitalization of people for shock or mental anxiety." Gorove, supra note 57, at 138-39. "What if some radiation injury had occurred requiring subsequent and extensive precautionary measures? Would the cost of such measures be covered in addition to damage for radiation injuries?" Id.
Some 
C. Diplomatic Resolution of the Cosmos 954 Incident
The Canadian claim against the Soviet Union was resolved through diplomatic channels. 1 ' After three rounds of negotiations in which the Canadian claim was discussed "with full consideration given to its legal and factual implications," a settlement was reached." 2 On April 2, 1981, a protocol was signed between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Soviet Union stating that the Soviets would pay, and Canada would accept Can.$3 million in full settlement of the claim and all matters arising out of the crash of the Soviet satellite.'
3
The text of the protocol gave no indication of a basis for agreemust be considered by the Soviet Union to those incurred by the occurrence of physical, psychological, or property damage or loss of life. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. The Canadians claimed that under general principles of international law, Canada's duty to mitigate and prevent damages would be recognized, see Canadian Claim, supra note 75, para. 17, at 905-06, but article I limits the application of these general principles to cases of article I damage. In the Cosmos 954 incident, it is not at all clear that there are any article I damages. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. 11. See Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 18-19. Article IX of the Liability Convention provides that a claim for compensation should be presented to a launching state through diplomatic channels. Liability Convention, supra note 1, art. IX. Furthermore, article XIV states that if no diplomatic resolution is reached within one year from the date of notice of the claim "the parties concerned shall establish a Claims Commission at the request of either party." Id. art. XIV. It has been suggested that such diplomatic negotiations had the purpose of defining the parameters of a dispute before any sort of tribunal took jurisdiction. Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 18. "Direct diplomatic discussions, in a written or oral form, are the simplest means offered to States in order to reach a settlement, particularly if the discussions are exclusively bilateral. 118. Legault & Farand, supra note 37, at 19-23. Due to the diplomatic nature of the resolution, there was no opportunity to see how the substantive provisions of the Liability Convention would work in the context of a satellite reentry and crash. Id. "Furthermore, it should be recognized that the Cosmos 954 claim was settled before a formal legal dispute had arisen between the parties." Id. at 22-23.
Considering that Canada received approximately one-half of the damages claimed which amounted to approximately one-half of the actual expenses of Operation Morning Light, it is evident that the only thing established by the Cosmos 954 resolution is that the victim might recover up to one-quarter of the costs incurred in mitigation of damages in a case like this one. See id. at 19-23.
VI. PROPOSAL
The Cosmos 954 incident focused international attention on the Liability Convention,119 but failed to provide any guidelines regarding what damages are compensable under the Convention.
2 0 As a result, a victim of space object damage is no more certain to recover "full compensation" under the Liability Convention today than it was before the Cosmos 954 incident.
The Legal Sub-Committee's treatment of articles I and XII demonstrates a disregard for the necessary consistency between the definition of damages and the measure of compensation.' 2 ' This disregard comes from the perception of the delegates that consideration of such terms as indirect damage or delayed damage, in a discussion of damages, 2 2 would result in no agreement at all on the definition.12 Unfortunately, the re- II, at 31 (1969) .
In order to avoid endless discussion on whether to include those terms of 'indirect damage' and 'delayed damage' in the definition of damage, we should discuss the problem of these two terms in the context of the manner in which the damage occurred, by introducing the notion of adequate relationship of cause and effect or so called 'the existence of proximity' in the Anglo-American laws. Id. This Japanese solution ignores the problem of the narrow definition of recoverable damages in article I.
Use of the concept of causation to allow consideration of indirect damage or delayed damage has been the subject of some comment. See, e.g., C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 96; Christol, supra note 13, at 361-62; Foster, supra note 2, at 157-58. However, this reliance on the concept of causation merely defers the determination of the recoverability of damages to the parties in a particular case. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
suiting definition eliminated any possibility that damages other than those enumerated in article I would ever be recoverable.
124
Article I does not include the concepts of indirect damage or delayed damage in its definition. 125 However, article XII, by incorporating international law and the principles ofjustice and equity, necessarily encompasses indirect damage and delayed damage concepts.
126
The Permanent Court of International Justice, 27 126. See C. CHRISTOL, supra note 3, at 97. "International law, rather than municipal law, will be invoked in reaching a decision as to the exact amounts to be recovered as damages. 19-26 (3d ed. 1973) . The PCIJ was closely connected to the League of Nations but was not an organ of the League. Its procedures were governed by the Rules of Procedure, adopted by the League in 1936 and taken over, virtually unchanged, by the United Nations and the present International Court ofJustice. Id. at 22.
The PCIJ saw 66 cases in 18 years, 38 being contentious and 28 advisory. Twenty-seven advisory opinions and 32 judgments were handed down by the PCIJ and 12 cases were settled independently of that body. clined to request return of the space object. 1 3 7 The principle that the launching state should be responsible for its space object at all times after it is launched 3 1 is defeated unless the launching state is held responsible for the cleanup, thereby relieving the victim state of that burden.
13 9 Under the proposed definition, preventive measures and cleanup costs would be recoverable where they are measurable and reasonable.' 4°I n drafting the Liability Convention, and in particular the definition of damage caused by space objects, the Legal SubCommittee overlooked the fundamental premise on which the international law of outer space is based.' 4 ' At its inception, COPUOS agreed to apply international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, to outer space." 42 However, instead of looking to international law to define damages in the Liability Convention, the Legal Sub-Committee drafted its own extremely limited definition, and relied on a reference to international law and the principles of justice and equity in article XII to broaden the article I definition.
14 3 The result is confu- 1, 3 (1982) .
139.
Id. This result would be consistent with the "principle of risk liability" established by the Liability Convention. Id.
140. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 141. The international law of outer space is to be based on general principles of international law including the Charter of the United Nations. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 22. 143. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text. The general definition intentionally leaves many issues unresolved "because it is impossible to enumerate-and it would have been impossible to agree on-all the various kinds of damage for which there would be compensation." P. van Fenema, supra note 43, at 31. "Some measure of precision in this respect could only be expected from a national law, where a body ofjurisprudence usually has given a more or less defined meaning to 'damage,' in the sense of what is compensable and what not." Id. at 31-32.
The question of what kinds of damage will give rise to compensation was further debated, together with the question of law or the principles to be applied to the assessment of damages. Id. at 33. In essence, the question of what damages would be compensable under the Liability Convention was meant to be deferred to the parties through either diplomatic resolution or the Claims Commission. P. van 
